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** * * *
Common justifications for the use of the letter of credit fail to explain its
widespread use. The classic explanation claims that the letter of credit provides an
effective assurance of payment from a financially responsible third party. In that
story, the seller — a Taiwanese clothing manufacturer, for example — fears that the
overseas buyer — Wal-Mart — will refuse to pay once the goods have been
shipped. Cross-border transactions magnify the concern, because the difficulties of
litigating in a distant forum will hinder the manufacturer’s efforts to force the
distant buyer to pay.1 The manufacturer-seller solves that problem by obtaining a
letter of credit from a reputable bank. A reputable bank is unlikely to default on its
obligation to pay the seller, and the seller knows that it has an absolute right to payment once it ships the goods — conditioned only on the seller’s presentation to the
bank of the specified documents (typically the invoice, a packing list, an insurance
certificate, and a transport document such as a bill of lading). Thus, the story goes,
the seller that obtains a letter of credit can rest assured that it will be paid even if the
buyer would not pay voluntarily. 2
The payment-assurance explanation tells a logical and plausible story. But it
rests on a line of reasoning that is largely untrue at one important and critical point:
the seller’s possession of an absolute right to payment. When I spoke anecdotally
to bankers and lawyers familiar with the industry, they uniformly claimed that
sellers ordinarily do not present documents that conform to the requirements of the
letter of credit. Among other things, documents might be missing, late, or fail to
precisely match the details about the shipment provided in the letter of credit.3
Under the standard payment-assurance account, the whole transaction hinges
on the seller having a reliable right to payment by the bank that issues the letter of
credit. But if the seller often does not submit documents that conform to the letter
of credit, then the seller has no right to payment at all, just a request for a payment
that will be honored only if the buyer waives the defects in the seller’s presentation.4
And if the seller’s ability to collect rests on the buyer’s unconstrained choice to

1. Lisa Bernstein’s paper in this symposium also focuses on the special difficulties of cross-border sales
transactions. See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Value Creation Through Rules,
Norms, and Institutions , 98 M ICH. L. REV. ????, ????- ???? (2000).
2. I myself have told that story. See RONALD J . MANN, PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND OTHER F INANCIAL
TRANSACTIONS 215-24 (1999). For similar ac counts in the standard sources, see JOHN F. DOLAN, THE LAW OF
LETTERSOF CREDIT : COMMERCIAL AND STANDBY CREDIT ¶ 1.01[3], at 1-7 (rev. ed. 1999); CLAYTON P. GILLETTE ET
AL ., P AYMENT SYSTEMS AND CREDIT INSTRUMENTS 560 (1996); JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 20-1, at 701-02 (4th ed. 1995).
3. For published references to the discrepancy problem, see Vincent M. Maulella, Payment Pitfalls for the
Unwary : How to Make Your Letter of Credit Work , WORLD TRADE, Apr. 1999, at 76, 76 (“US bankers report that
50% to 60% of all letter of credit document presentations are found discrepant on first examination.”); Martin
Shaw, Martin Shaw Claims There Are Better Ways to Reduce Discrepancies and That ICC Should Take Advantage of
Them, DOCUMENTARY CREDITS INSIGHT , Spring 1999, at 11 (reporting the views of “informed observers” that “at
least 50% — some say perhaps 60% or even 70%” of presentations do not comply); see also UCP preface, at 4
(“Some surveys indicate that approximately fifty per cent of the documents presented under the Documentary
Credit are rejected b ecause of discrepancies or apparent discrep ancies.”).
4. See UCP art. 14(c) (authorizing issuer of letter of credit to approach applicant to seek a waiver of
discrepancies in presentation).
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waive defects in the seller’s presentation, then why buy the letter of credit instead of
the simpler (and presumably cheaper) course of shipping the goods and simply
waiting for payment from the buyer?5 That parties to a sale transaction would
ignore formal documentation requirements is not surprising, but their systematic
purchase of a product conditioned on their compliance with requirements they
commonly ignore does not appear rational.
Intrigued by that question, I explored the topic in detail in the summer of 1999.
I gathered data in two ways. First, I visited five separate banks on-site to collect
data on their letter-of-credit transactions. Although all of the banks are located in
the United States, I selected institutions of sufficient variety to get a representative
picture of the industry as a whole. I visited the following banks: (a) a large U.S.
regional bank headquartered in the Midwest with significant letter-of-credit volume;
(b) a mid-sized U.S. regional bank headquartered in the Northeast with significant
letter-of-credit volume; (c) a major U.S. domestic bank headquartered in the West
with worldwide letter-of-credit operations; (d) a major foreign bank, with more than
one U.S. location and with worldwide letter-of-credit operations; and (e) a major
U.S. bank headquartered in the Northeast with worldwide letter-of-credit
operations.6 At each bank I personally collected information on 100 transactions
(50 “import” transactions, in which the bank’s client was the buyer, and 50
“export” transactions, in which the bank’s client was the seller).7 For each transaction, I recorded 25 data points.8 Among other things, I determined whether the
presentation conformed to the letter of credit and, if it did not, what the
discrepancies were, and the parties’ response to them.9 As a matter of practicality, I
relied entirely on the banks’ internal documentation of those issues. The banks, of
course, could have erred in their assessment of discrepancies, but given the point of
my study — understanding how parties react to discrepancies — data regarding
their perception of discrepancies is directly relevant.10
5. For a brief description of the principal alternate methods of payment, see infra pages 421-423.
6. In order to obtain access to the banks’ files I had to agree not to disclose the particular banks that I
visited.
7. The transactions were selected to provide a random sample of recently completed transactions.
Because the object of my study is to examine discrepancies in presentations, I excluded files in which the
seller never presented a demand for payment under the letter of credit. Also, to avoid oversampling particular
transactions, I only collected one profile from each file (even if the file included numerous presentations on a
single letter of credit). At each bank I continued to select files until I had a total (not counting the excluded
files) of 50 import and 50 export transactions.
8. The information — about 12,500 data points — is in a Microsoft Access database. Copies of that file
are available on request.
9. I also collected a variety of background information: whether the letter of credit was confirmed, the
countries in which the buyer and seller were located, the time when payment was due under the letter of
credit, whether the letter of credit permitted multiple draws, the type of goods covered by the letter of credit,
how the applicant paid the issuer for drafts on the letter of credit, whether the discrepancies suggested a
contractual default, whether the discrepancies appeared to be curable, how the export-side bank responded to
the documents, whether an export-side bank missed discrepancies that an import-side bank found, how
waiver of discrepancies was sought, and how many days elapsed before the applicant waived the
discrepancies.
10. In any event, it would not have been possible to reexamine the documents; in most cases the original
documents (which often include transport documents that the buyer must use to obtain the merchandise in
question) no longer were in the file.
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To supplement the raw data, I also interviewed ten bankers who engage in
letter-of-credit transactions.11 I interviewed five of the bank officers who supervise
the sites that I visited and five officers at other banks with substantial letter-of-credit
portfolios (two other large American banks, and three Tokyo-based Japanese
banks).12 Those interviews explored the significance of discrepancies in letter-ofcredit transactions.
Part I of this Article briefly describes the basic letter-of-credit transaction. Part
II describes the discrepancies that appear in those transactions, providing detail
from the data I collected. The data generally support the anecdotal information
that led me to conduct the study: the documents presented in the 500 transactions I
examined conformed to the letter of credit only 27% of the time. The payment
transactions rendered the discrepancies irrelevant because the buyer waived the
discrepancies in all but one case and provided full payment for the shipment in spite
of the discrepant presentation.13
Part III uses the data and the interviews described above to assess the possible
reasons for the common use of letter of credit. First, I reject the possibility that
businesses use letters of credit out of irrational habit or custom because the ready
availability and frequent use of alternative payment transactions strongly suggests
that businesses rationally use letters of credit. Second, I evaluate the persuasiveness
of the classic payment-assurance story and conclude that the payment-assurance
story probably still has some plausibility, at least in contexts (such as many exports
from the United States) where parties select the letter of credit to compensate for
the weakness of relational ties between the buyer and the seller.
Finally, I consider some alternative reasons that might motivate commercial
enterprises to use letters of credit. Specifically, I argue that the issuing bank’s
ability to verify information about the purchaser and the transaction provides the
most compelling reason for widespread use of letters of credit. The issuer verifies
information about the purchaser and the transaction in two ways. In the first and
principal scenario, commonly used in situations where the parties have no
significant relationship, the willingness of the bank to issue the letter of credit
signals to the potential seller that the purchaser will not withhold payment for
illegitimate reasons. In the second scenario, the bank’s willingness to issue the
letter of credit verifies to the government (or another financial institution) the
legitimacy of the transaction, and the letter of credit indirectly assists in the
enforcement of currency controls and laws against money laundering.
Those two explanations share a common and obvious thread: the problem of
information asymmetry. In both situations, the parties design a transaction to
include a letter of credit to respond to an information imbalance at the time the
11. Transcripts of the interviews (redacted to satisfy confidentiality requirements) are available on
request.
12. The two American interviews were conducted by telephone; the Japanese interviews were conducted
in person in Tokyo. The two interviews with American banks were conducted on condition of anonymity.
Two of the Japanese banks were Fuji and Sumitomo; the third interview was conducted on condition of
anonymity.
13. Even in that one case (Profile 457), the seller did not refuse payment entirely, but authorized a
discounted payment of 94% of the amount upon which the parties originally had agreed.
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transaction begins. Thus, to use my own terminology, I argue that the letter of
credit generally serves as a verification institution to resolve that information
problem. 14
I.

THE BASIC L ETTER - OF-C REDIT TRANSACTION

This study focuses on the basic commercial15 letter-of-credit transaction. That
transaction has two sides: an import side (the buyer) and an export side (the seller).
Both sides ordinarily have a bank, which makes a total of four parties to the
transaction. The bank on the import, or buyer’s, side of the transaction normally
issues the letter of credit, which obligates the bank to pay the purchase price upon
the receipt of specified documents.16 Letter-of-credit rules typically describe the
importer as the applicant and the applicant’s bank as the issuing bank or the issuer
of the letter of credit.17 The fees differ significantly from market to market, and
from customer to customer (with better customers paying much less). As a general
matter, however, the total fees for the banks issuing and processing the letter of
credit are likely to approximate ¼ of one percent of the amount of the letter of
credit. On a $1,000,000 sale of goods, then, use of a letter of credit would require
about $2,500.18 Figure One illustrates the typical transaction.
F IGURE 1

14. For a general discussion of verification institutions, see Ronald J. Mann, Verification Institutions in
Financing Transactions , 87 GEORGETOWN L.J. 2225 (1999).
15. The reference to “commercial” letters of credit limits my study to letters of credit used to provide
payment in the ordinary course of a contract for the sale of goods. I exclude the other principal type of letter
of credit, the “standby” letter of credit often used to provide a secondary means of payment when an obligor
defaults on some other obligation. See DOLAN , supra note 2, ¶ 1.04, at 1-20 to 1-24 (discussing the distinction
between commercial and standby letters of credit); M ANN, supra note 2, at 372-73 (same). For the sake of
comparison, I did, however, collect information at two banks on discrepancies in standby letter-of-credit
transactions. My data on that point, however, are much more limited (only 24 files) because it is quite rare
for presentations to be made against the kind of standby letters of credit described above. {Presentations are
common against so-called “direct-pay” standbys, see DOLAN, supra note 2, ¶ 1.06, at 1-45 & n.170, but I
excluded those transactions from the sample that I examined.} Those data are included in the same database
as the principal data.
16. See UCC § 5-102(a)(10) (defining a letter of credit as an undertaking to pay in response to a
documentary presentation); see also UCC § 5-108(g) (authorizing the issuer to “disregard” any
nondocumentary conditions in a letter of credit); UCP art. 13(c) (same).
17. See UCC § 5-102(a)(2) (defining “applicant” for purposes of letter-of-credit law); UCC § 5-102(a)(9)
(defining “issuer” for purposes of letter-of-credit law); UCP art. 2 (defining “Applicant” and “Issuing Bank”
for purposes of the UCP).
18. See M ANN, supra note 2, at 217.
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Central to the letter-of-credit system is the concept of independence: the bank’s
obligation on the letter of credit is completely separate from any of the contractual
obligations of the underlying transaction, either the obligation of the buyer to pay
the seller under ordinary principles that govern sales transactions, or any obligation
that the buyer might have under an agreement or common-law principles to
reimburse the bank for payments made on its behalf under the letter of credit.19 The
bank’s obligation depends entirely on the beneficiary’s presentation of documents
that conform to the requirements of the letter of credit.20 Indeed, the rules
governing letters of credit so thoroughly separate the bank’s obligation to pay from
ordinary context-laden principles of contract law, that it is best thought of, to use
Roy Goode’s apt term, as an “abstract payment undertaking” — an enforceable
undertaking to make payment wholly abstracted from the underlying transaction.21
19. In the UCC’s language:
Rights and obligations of an issuer to a beneficiary . . . under a letter of credit are independent of the
existence, performance, or nonperformance of a contract or arrangement out of which the letter of credit
arises or which underlies it, including contracts or arrangements between the issuer and the applicant and
between the applicant and the beneficiary.
UCC § 5-103(d); see UCP art. 3(a) (“Credits, by their nature, are separate transactions from the sales or other
contract(s) on which they may be based and banks are in no way con cerned with or bound by such
contract(s), even if any reference whatsoever to such co ntract(s) is included in the Credit.”).
20. See UCP art. 4 (“In Credit operations all parties concerned deal with documents, and not with
goods, services and/or other performances to which the documents may relate.”). Neither the UCC nor the
UCP requires any particular documents to be presented; each letter of credit describes the documents to be
presented. It is quite difficult to genera lize, but a typical list would include, among other things, an invoice,
packing list, insurance certificate, some transport document (such as a bill of lading), and often some form of
inspection certificate.
21. See Roy Goode, Abstract Payment Undertakings, in ESSAYS FOR P ATRICK ATIYAH 209, 209-13 (P. Cane
& J. Stapleton eds. 1991). For a more readily available explanation of the point, see Roy Goode, Abstract
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The bank on the export, or seller’s, side plays a different role. The seller hopes
to receive the funds offered by the letter of credit as payment for the anticipated
shipment, and is thus identified as the “beneficiary” of the letter of credit.22
Because the beneficiary and applicant ordinarily are in different countries,23 the
beneficiary often has its own bank to help process the letter of credit when it is
issued by the applicant’s bank overseas and then forwards the docume nts that seek
payment from the issuer when the seller ships the goods.24 The beneficiary’s bank
ordinarily assumes one of two roles.25 If it only “advises” the beneficiary of the
issuance of the letter of credit, it just processes the documents and has no direct
liability on the letter of credit.26 Alternatively, it might “confirm” the letter of
credit, in which case the beneficiary’s bank directly obligates itself on the letter of
credit,27 pays the beneficiary directly, and then forwards the documents to the issuer
for reimbursement.28 Figure 2 illustrates the payment process.
F IGURE 2

Payment Undertakings and the Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 725, 731-35
(1995).
22. See UCC § 5-102(a)(3) (defining “beneficiary” for purposes of letter-of-credit law); UCP art. 2(i)
(defining “Beneficiary” for purposes of the UCP).
23. The goods were shipped from one country to another in all but 51 (10.2%) of the files. Even that
figure may be distorted by an unusually high rate of same-country files at the bank that I refer to as the Major
Northeast Bank (33 of the 51 same-country shipments). Excluding the Major Northeast Bank, the rate of
same-country shipments was only 4.5%.
24. The beneficiary presented documents directly to the issuer, without retaining its own intermediary
financial institution, in only 15 (3%) of my files. Again, that rate may be distorted by an unusually high rate
of direct presentation files at the Major Northeast Bank (9 of the 15 direct presentations). Excluding the
Major Northeast Bank, the rate of direct presentations was only 1.5%.
25. The beneficiary’s bank is described in the statute as a “nominated person,” that is, a person that the
issuer permits to process documents from the beneficiary and obtain payment from the issuer. UCC § 5102(a)(11).
26. See UCC § 5-107(c); UCP art. 7(a).
27. See UCC § 5-107(a) ; UCP art. 9(b). In the 250 export-side files that I examined, the beneficiary’s
bank confirmed the letter of credit in 55 (22%) of the files.
28. The UCC grants that right of reimbursement indirectly. UCC Section 5-108(i)(1) grants the issuer a
right of reimbursement against the applicant; UCC Section 5-107(a) states that the confirmer has the same
rights against the issuer as the issuer has against the applicant. See M ANN, supra note 2, at 230-31.
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DISCREPANCIES IN LETTER - OF-C REDIT TRANSACTIONS

I set out to collect information about discrepancies in the presentations that
beneficiaries make seeking payment on commercial letters of credit. Accordingly, I
start by describing what the data suggest about those discrepancies. The data, of
course, can only suggest explanations, because I did not collect information from a
statistically valid sample of all letter-of-credit transactions. Although I collected my
data from banks of varying sizes and types, the broad inter-bank variations within
the data indicate that a complete picture of discrepancies would require a larger
study based on a statistically valid sample drawn from a broader range of
transactions.
Nevertheless, the consistency of certain patterns provides considerable
information about the dynamics of commercial letter-of-credit transactions and how
they can function with such high rates of discrepancies. I first discuss the
discrepancies themselves; then I turn to the response of the applicant to the
discrepancies.
A.

The Nature of the Discrepancies

As expected, the data illustrate a high rate of discrepancies: the presentations
conformed to the letters of credit in only 135 (27%) of the 500 files. Although the
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rates did differ from bank to bank — with a high of 36% and a low of 17%29 —
conforming presentations provided the exception to a general pattern of
discrepancy. The data offer considerable detail about the types of defects and the
types of transactions where they frequently occur. Accordingly, I discuss those
topics in turn.
1.

What Are the Discrepancies?

The data reveal the surprising severity of the discrepancies and, in my mind,
rebut any suggestion30 that the high discrepancy rates reported by anecdote and
found in the files arise from hypertechnical document examination practices.31
First, more than a quarter of the presentations that contained discrepancies (98 out
of the 343 files, 29%)32 appeared to suggest a contractual default by the seller — not
just a failure to comply with the technical provisions of the letter of credit, but a
failure to comply with the substantive provisions of the underlying sales contract.33
29. The conformity rates were 26% at the Midwest Bank, 17% at the Mid-Sized North east Bank, 29% at
the West-Coast Bank, 27% at the Foreign Bank, and 36% at the Major Northeast Bank.
30. See, e.g., Boris Kozolchyk, The UNIDROIT Principles as a Model for the Unification of the Best
Contractual Practices in the Americas , 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 151, 160-61 (1998) (arguing that “arbitrary” judicial
evaluations of discrepancies “had encouraged bad faith practices by bankers and their customers whereby
meaningless defects in the documents tendered by beneficiaries were used to justify non-payment of letters of
credit”).
31. Clay Gillette suggests in his comment on this article that bankers have an incentive to classify
documents as discrepant to protect themselves against claims by their customers of wrongful honor. See
Clayton P. Gillette, Comment on Ronald Mann’s The Role of Letters of Credit in Payment Transactions, 98
M ICH . L. REV. ????, ????-???? (2000). One difficulty with that view is that it ignores the likelihood — which I
consider quite strong — that bankers want to avoid an appearance of unduly strict document examination
because undue strictness undermines their apparent willingness to stand behind the letters of credit that they
issue.
Moreover, if he is correct, bankers should support relatively vague standards for document examination.
Cf., e.g., Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law , 98 COLUM. L. REV.
1908, 1927-40 (1998) (presenting an analogous argument that the interests of Delaware corporate lawyers are
advanced by indeterminacy of legal rules). In fact, although the examination practice might seem
hypertechnical to the outsider, American banks have expended considerable effort to enhance the objectivity
of document examination. The bankers might be suffering from false consciousness, but they certainly believe
that objectivity in examination standards furthers their interests, primarily by making it easier to identify bad
actors (so that reputational sanctions can root them out). The most recent effort is illustrative, the promulgation of a detailed document (used at all of the banks that I visited) describing the items that banks should
check on the most commonly presented types of documents. See U.S. COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL BANKING,
INC., STANDARD BANKING P RACTICE FOR THE EXAMINATION OF LETTER OF CREDIT DOCUMENTS (1996); see also Boris
Kozolchyk, The “Best Practices” Approach to the Uniformity of International Commercial Law: The UCP 500 and
the NAFTA Implementation Experience , 13 ARIZ . J . INT ’L & COMP. L. 443, 446-48 (1996) (discussing
development of the USCIB standards). As doubts about the standards for document examination overseas
suggest (see, e.g., infra notes 47 & 50), it is not at all clear that those efforts have made significant progress
overseas.
32. Although 365 files failed to comply, 22 of those files were not even examined: in those cases the
applicant approved payment without the need for examination of the doc uments. Thus, the information that
I report about the types of defaults states percentages as a share of the 343 examined files found to be
discrepant.
33. As mentioned in the introduction, I relied entirely on the banks’ assessment to determine what
discrepancies existed. See supra text accompanying note 10. I had to judge for myself, however, whether the
discrepancies suggested a contractual default, something that was not always clear. I made a judgment call at
the time I examined the file as to whether I thought the discrepancies collectively raised a serious doubt about
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Moreover, although the relatively subjective problem of defective documents arose
frequently,34 a large number of the non-contractual defaults were plainly objective
defects upon which no informed document examiner could disagree. For example,
75 of the presentations (22%) did not contain a document required by the letter of
credit; 62 (18%) involved a shipment later than the period specified in the letter of
credit; in 48 (14%) the beneficiary presented documents late35 ; in 36 (11%) the letter
of credit had expired36 ; and in 16 (5%) the documents sought payment for an ove rdraft (an amount that exceeded the balance remaining on the letter of credit).37
TABLE O NE: TYPES OF DISCREPANCIES
Defective Documents

293 (85%)

Missing Documents

75 (22%)

Late Shipment

62 (18%)

Late Presentation

48 (14%)

Expired

36 (11%)

Overdraft

16 (5%)

Incorrect Shipment

14 (4%)

Partial Shipment

7 (2%)

Other

2 (1%)

Total Discrepancies

554

Total Discrepant Files

365

Files Not Examined

22

Files Examined

343

Those discrepancies, however, do not generally suggest a serious failure of
performance by the seller on the underlying sales contract; in 201 of the files (59%),
the defects found on examination did not suggest a contractual default by the

the performance by the seller. Because I was interested in the frequency with which technical defects that do
not go to the seller’s performance appear as discrepancies, I tried to err on the side of assuming that there
might be a d efault.
34. Defects in documents collectively constituted the largest category of discrepancy, appearing in 293
(85.4%) of the files. It is particularly difficult to determine whether defective documents suggest a contractual
default, because it is rarely possible to tell from the file whether the defect reflects inadequate performance or
inadequate documentation of ad equate performance.
35. Unless the letter of credit stipulates otherwise, documents must be presented no later than 21 days
after the date of shipment. UCP art. 43(a). It was not common for the parties to alter that 21-day period in
the letters of credit that I examined.
36. In addition to the implied deadline for presentation mentioned in the previous note, each letter of
credit includes an express date on which the credit expires. Any later presentation is defective. UCP art.
42(b); see UCP art. 44(a) (implied extension of expiration date to next business day).
37. In assessing those numbers, it is important to remember that many presentations contained multiple
defects. Thus, the figures in the text count most of the files multiple times (because discrepant files often
contained multiple defects, 554 defects in 343 examined files with discrepancies).
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beneficiary. 38 Those defects, although often objectively indisputable problems with
the presentation, do not suggest default because they involve minor documentary
defects such as an inadequate signature on a bill of lading or a technical inaccuracy
in describing the collateral, to name two common examples; or other defects of
presentation rather than performance — late presentation (48 files, 14%),39
expiration (36 files (11%), or overdraft (16 files, 5%).
TABLE T WO: DISCREPANCIES AND C ONTRACTUAL DEFAULT
Discrepancies Indicating Default

98/343 (29%)

Discrepancies Not Indicating Default

201/343 (59%)

Residual (Unable to Classify)

44/343 (13%)

The data highlight one structural difficulty with the letter-of-credit system. If
the system worked perfectly, documentary presentations would sort transactions
based on the beneficiary’s performance: the documents would comply when the
beneficiary had performed as agreed and the documents would not comply when
the beneficiary had not performed as agreed.40 As the data show, however, more
than half of the files included defects that vitiated the beneficiary’s right to collect
payment, even though those same defects did not call into question the caliber of
the beneficiary’s performance on the contract. As industry observers recognize, the
poor fit between discrepancies and default suggests a problem with the letter-ofcredit system.41
2.

When Do Discrepancies Appear?

Even a casual examination of the data suggests that the discrepancies do not
appear uniformly throughout the transactions. Dividing the files into import and
export transactions provides the most apparent distinction.
As discussed above, each transaction has an import side and an export side.
Because I collected information about transactions with the banks on both sides, I
can explore the possibility that discrepancy rates relate to the role played by the
bank. The rate of discrepancies might relate to the bank’s role because a bank on
the import side normally reviews documents that the beneficiary’s bank has already
38. As mentioned above (supra note 33), I treated ambiguous cases as suggesting a default. Thus, that
59% figure is, if anything, understated.
39. Late presentation (which I did not treat as a contractual default) must be distinguished from late
shipment, which I did treat as a contractual default.
40. I leave to one side the question whether the performance that the system seeks is performance up to
standards set by unenforceable industry norms or performance up to the standards of judicially enforceable
contractual provisions. For discussion of the distinction between those two different types of standards, see
Bernstein, supra note 1.
41. See Shaw, supra note 3, at 11-12. Bob Rasmussen has pointed out to me that the poor fit is less
relevant if you accept the idea (proposed in Part III of this Article) that letters of credit operate primarily as a
device for verifying the reliability of the applicant rather than as a device for assuring payment. In any event,
analysis of that problem is far beyond the scope of this Article.
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evaluated. All other things being equal, that relationship would suggest a lower
rate of discrepancies on the import side of the transaction than on the export side:
the beneficiary’s bank should weed out defective documents in some class of cases,
so that they would not even forward the most obviously defective documents to the
issuer. Similarly, the beneficiary’s bank could help the seller to correct simple
discrepancies. As a result of those processes, an issuer — acting on the import side
of the transaction — would receive a “cleansed” pool of documents to review, with
a lower rate of discrepancies than it would find in documents it reviewed from the
export side of transactions.
TABLE T HREE : DISCREPANCY R ATES
NUMBER OF

PERCENTAGE OF

DISCREPANCIES

DISCREPANCIES

Import Transactions

196/250

78%

Export Transactions

169/250

68%

Overall

365/500

73%

At first glance, however, my data seem to contradict that understanding,
because the import-side files contained a significantly higher rate of discrepancies
(78%, 196 out of 250 files)42 than the export-side files (68%, 169 out of 250 files).43
On the other hand, the data about the activities of export-side banks suggest that
export banks do cure discrepancies. As I mention above, the beneficiary’s banks
identified discrepancies in 169 of the 250 sets of documents submitted to them. But
the export-side banks obtained complying documents in 68 (40%) of those 169 files,
leaving discrepancies in only 101 files. Thus, the beneficiary’s banks were able to
forward documents that complied in a total of 149 (60%) of their 250 transactions.
The higher concern about documentary compliance exhibited by American
banks and exporters provides the most salient explanation for these figures.44
42. Because I do not have access to the files of the export-side bank that handled the import-side files
that I examined, I do not know what the rate of discrepancy was when the documents originally were
presented by the customers in those transactions; I know only the rate of discrepancy that persisted after
processing by the export-side bank, as evidenced by the documents reviewed by the import-side bank. The
rate of discrepancy identified in the text does not change significantly even if I exclude the fifteen direct
presentations (as to which the “cleansing” hypothesis is not relevant). All of the direct presentations
(obviously) were import transactions (because the beneficiary-seller came straight to the issuer without using
an intermediary export-side bank). Excluding those transactions (five of which n
i volved conforming
documents), the import discrepancy rate would have been 79.1% (186 out of 235).
43. The difference in the proportion of discrepancies between the two sides is significant at the .01 level.
See infra Statistical Appendix.
44. Indeed, more than one banker suggested that in Asia banks offer a standard product in which the
seller agrees up front that its bank will not exam ine the documents, but instead will forward them
immediately to the issuer without determining whether they comply. See Notes from Site Visit to Foreign
Bank, at 1 (Aug. 26, 1999 — Aug. 27, 1999) [copy on file with author] [hereinafter Foreign Bank Site Visit
Notes]; Notes from Site Visit to Midwest Bank, at 4 (July 28, 1999 — July 29, 1999) [copy on file with
author] [hereinafter Midwest Bank Site Visit Notes]. It is not likely that the pattern that I discern is
permanent. More than one banker suggested that a reverse pattern — more compliant documents coming
into the United States than going out — was characteristic in earlier years. See Telephone Interview with
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Comparing the 22% rate45 of incoming conforming documents (documents that
American issuers receive from overseas export-side banks) to the 60% rate of
outgoing conforming documents described in the preceding paragraph (documents
that American export-side banks transmit to overseas issuers) demonstrates this
concern most starkly. 46 Contrasting the domestic figures with the rate of complying
documents forwarded by overseas banks further reinforces the higher regard that
American banks and sellers have for producing compliant documents. The 22%
figure of incoming compliant documents, which includes both initially compliant
documents and initially defective but cured documents, is less than either (I) the rate
of initially defective documents cured by American export-side banks (40%, 68 out
of 169) or (II) the rate of initially compliant documents submitted by exporters in
this country (32%, 81 out of 250).
TABLE F OUR : IMPORT AND EXPORT C OMPLIANCE
NUMBER OF

PERCENTAGE OF

COMPLYING FILES

COMPLYING FILES

Import Compliance Rate

54/250

22%

Total Export Compliance Rate

149/250

60%

Initial Compliance (by Customers)

81/250

32%

Cured (by Bank)

68/169

40%

Although a variety of considerations doubtless contribute on a country-bycountry basis to the differing rates of attention to discrepancies, the interviews with
bankers suggest that the relative reliability of the American commercial and
Manager, Trade Serv ice Issues, Second Major Northeast Bank (Sept. 21, 1999) [transcript on file with author]
[hereinafter Second Major Northeast Bank Telephone Interview] (transcript at 5-6); Telephone Interview with
Vice President and Operations Manager, West-Coast Bank (Aug. 12, 1999) [transcript on file with author]
[West-Coast Bank Interview] (transcript at 4); see also Interview with Yutaka Abe, Senior Manager, Overseas
Business Division, The Fuji Bank, Limited, Tokyo (June 15, 1999) [transcript on file with author] [hereinafter
Fuji Bank Interview] (transcript at 3) (suggesting that discrepancies formerly were much higher in Jap anese
import transactions than they are now).
45. That rate is simply the flip side of the 78% discrepancy rate in import-side transactions. I also should
emphasize that the rate differs considerably from bank to bank. In my data, it varied from 72% to 82%. One
other Ameri can banker with a large portfolio told me that the discrepancy rate in his import portfolio was
only 60%. Second Major Northeast Bank Telephone Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at 2). It also varies
significantly from customer to customer. One banker explained that although some of his customers submitted documents that complied 99.9% of the time, others submit documents that are discrepant 90% of the
time. Second Major Northeast Bank Telephone Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at 15); see also Maulella,
supra note 3 (“[S]ome exporters report that over 95% of the document presentations are in order; other
exporters report a 95% frustration rate.”).
46. Again, because I do not have access to the files of the export-side banks in my im port-side
transactions, there always is the possibility that those banks had a systematically different view of the rate of
discrepancy in the documents that I transmitted. See infra note 50 (discussing anecdotal evidence related to
document-examination practices in Japan). To make any sense of the practice, however, I have to use some
baseline for compliance and given data collected only from United States banks it makes sense to use United
States document-examination practices as a baseline. Responding to that concern, I hope to collect similar
data in Japan later this year.
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banking systems is the leading general cause. They explain it as follows: the party
sending goods into the United States tends to worry less about the likelihood of
misconduct by the United States purchaser than a corresponding United States
exporter considering the likelihood of misconduct by an overseas purchaser.47
Indeed, the same idea supports the notion that letters of credit on shipments into
the United States serve a different function (unrelated to the reliability of the United
States buyer48 ) from the function that they normally serve on shipments out of the
United States (where the reliability of the overseas buyer might be central to the use
of the letter of credit).49
This explanation does not ring true with all countries with trading partners of
American companies, but it likely covers many less-developed countries with
relatively unstable economic conditions and undeveloped legal systems. Together,
those conditions can make the reliability of the letter of credit less crucial for the
party selling goods into the United States than for the party selling goods out of the
United States. Accordingly, the American exporter sending goods overseas (and its
bank) will work harder to ensure that they have complied with the conditions of the
letter of credit than an overseas exporter sending goods into the United States (and
its bank).50
Indeed, the interviews suggest that in many countries the export-side bank
transmitting goods into the United States will not even bother to examine the
documents before forwarding them.51 Thus, in those cases the bank makes no effort
47. See West-Coast Bank Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at 7) (“Our whole setup is based on not
sending documents out of here which a bank overseas can find discrepancies with . . . because we know that
in some areas of the world it’s a tendency to find discrepancies for the sole purpose of coming up with a
discount.”). Interestingly, one banker suggested that banks follow country-by-country conditions so closely
that they step up the vigilance of their document checking in countries (such as Asian countries in recent
years) that appear to be undergoing particular crises. See Telephone Interview with Vice President, Bank
Number 1 (Aug. 6, 1999) [transcript on file with author] [hereinafter Midwest Bank Interview] (transcript at
12-13). As he explained, although the banks in the country under stress might honor discrepant documents
99% of the time under normal conditions, “in hard times they might reject half of them.” Id. (transcript at
13).
48. See infra section III(C)(2).
49. See infra section III(C)(1). I thank Bob Rasmussen for pushing me to see that point.
50. Some loose evidence of the less stringent document-review practices overseas seems to be apparent
from the perception of Japanese banks that there is a very low rate of discrepancy in the documents they
receive from their cli ents in export transactions. See Interview with Deputy General Manager (Special
Assignments), Deputy General Manager, and Senior Manager, Anonymous Japanese Bank, Tokyo (June 17,
1999) [transcript on file with author] [hereinaf ter Anonymous Japanese Bank Interview] (reporting a
discrepancy rate on export transactions of only 35%); Interview with Hiroshi Higuma, Assistant Manager,
Corporate Planning Dept., The Sumitomo Bank, Limited, Tokyo (June 21, 1999) [transcript on file with
author] [hereinafter Sumitomo Interview] (transcript at 3) (reporting a discrepancy rate on export transactions
of only 15% {albeit after cure efforts at the branch-bank level}).
Those rates suggest to me that a considerably different standard for document examination prevails in
Japan than the one that prevails in American banks reviewing documents received from Japan. As it
happens, my information on documents coming into this country from Japan (4 of the 13 Japan-based import
transactions {31%} included comply ing prese ntations) is too limited to support any inferences about those
practices. Moreover, even if I examined Japanese transactions at a Japanese bank it would not provide direct
evidence of the relative rigor of their document examination practices. The most obvious test would require
using American-trained examiners to study a set of documents also submitted to Jap anese examiners; that
type of test is not practical with the logistical resources available for my research.
51. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (mentioning refe rences to that practice).

MLR R EVISED G ALLEYS1.DOC

August 2000]

05/03/00 12:36 PM

Letters of Credit as Verification Institutions

415

at all to cure discrepancies, a far cry from the apparent American banking practice
of scrutinizing documents and curing about 40% of the discrepant documents
submitted by their customers.52
Because I did not examine export-side transactions in the files of any overseas
banks, I have no direct observations of their effort (or lack of effort) to cure
defective documents. I can, however, compare the frequency that documents with
curable defects were not cured in transactions coming into and going out of the
United States.53 The 250 export transactions included 236 transactions outbound
from the United States, of which 36 (15%) included curable discrepancies that were
not cured. By contrast, the 250 import transactions included 178 transactions
inbound to the United States, of which 79 (44%) included curable discrepancies that
were not cured.54
The variety of explanations offered by the bankers suggests the need for
considerably more data to explain the phenomena persuasively. For example, one
banker pointed to the differing types of typical credits for the two sets of
transactions: incoming shipments into the United States are much more likely a
part of substantial long-term relationships (as to which discrepancies are less
important)55 while outgoing shipments from the United States are much more likely
“one-off” transactions where the shipper enjoys limited relational protections.56
Another banker offered a different transaction-based explanation: price changes
that make opportunism more beneficial occur more commonly with commodities
shipments (which characterize transactions going out from the United States) than
on manufactured-goods shipments (which characterize transactions coming into the

52. Clay Gillette suggests in his comment on this article that the high rate of uncured defects is
unsurprising, reasoning that buyers easily could cure the defects in the rare case in which a seller is
intransigent. See Gillette, supra note 31, at ????- ????. In most cases, however, that would be impractical. For
one thing, no amount of effort could cure a presentation that involves a late shipment, late presentation, or
expired letter of credit. At least one of those defects appeared in — of the 343 discrepant files that I
examined. Furthermore, because documents ordinarily must be presented no more than 21 days after the
shipment (see UCP art. 43(a); supra note 35), and because documents ordinarily are presented quite close to
the presentation deadline in the first instance, it seems most unlikely that a buyer in any significant group of
cases could (a) present discrepant documents; (b) await rejection by the seller; (c) cure the discrepancy; and
(d) still represent compliant documents before expiration of the 21-day time frame.
53. At the time I examined the files I included for each file a notation reflecting my judgment as to
whether it was easily practicable for the benefici ary or the beneficiary’s bank to cure the defect in question.
54. I use the total number of transactions as the denominator, rather than the number in which
discrepant documents initially were presented, because I do not know the number of the import transactions
in which discrepant documents initially we re presented.
55. As suggested above, see supra text accompanying nn. 48-49, that thesis gains some support from the
analysis in Part III(C)(2), which outlines several country-specific reasons why export transactions from the
United States might use letters of credit in continuing rel ationships, even though there is good reason to think
that exporters generally use letters of credit less often in continuing relationships, see infra pages 423-423
(discussing the possible inverse connection between letters of credit and the strength of the buyer-seller
relationship).
56. See Midwest Bank Interview, supra note 47 (transcript at 11-12); see also Interview with Vice
President and Manager, International Operations, Bank Number 2 (Aug. 5, 1999) (location not disclosed to
protect anonymity) [transcript on file with author] [hereinafter Mid-Sized Northeast Bank Interview]
(transcript at 12) (explaining that relational considerations are the prime motivation for buyers to waive
discrepancies in documents presented for payment on letters of credit).
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United States).57 I did not collect sufficiently objective data on the types of goods
covered by the shipment to evaluate that thesis statistically, but outgoing
(commodities) shipments would plausibly have higher price fluctuation than
incoming (finished goods) shipments.

57. See Second Major Northeast Bank Telephone Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at 6).
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Summarizing, Figure Three illustrates the most likely explanation of the data
— the existence of four different rates of discrepancy. In transactions exporting
goods from the United States, beneficiaries submit discrepant documents about
68% of the time, and cure efforts of banks lower the discrepancy rate to about
40%. 58 In transactions importing goods into the United States, parties make little
effort to cure defects, so that the initial presentation discrepancy rate probably59 is
about the same as the 78% discrepancy rate in documents forwarded to United
States issuers.60
B.

Waiving Discrepancies

Because the frequency of discrepancies motivated this study, the information
described above was not entirely surprising; it confirmed anecdotal descriptions
with an added wealth of detail that serves as fodder for new speculation. The
response to the defaults was the most surprising. I expected to find that applicants
seize on the discrepancies in a significant number of cases — including many cases
in which the discrepancies did not suggest a contractual default — as a basis for
delaying or withholding payment to the beneficiary on the letter of credit.61
The data suggest that my expectation was wrong: even when the documents
suggest a default on the underlying contract, applicants almost always waive the
discrepancies and permit full payment to the beneficiaries under the letter of credit.
In the 365 files with discrepancies, the applicants waived the discrepancies and
permitted full payment in every file but one. And in that file the applicant did not

58. The limited evidence that I collected in Japan does not robustly support that understanding of the
American data. Because Japan has an economy that resembles the American economy in what seem to be all
relevant respects, I would have expected the data from Japan to resemble the data from the United States on
this point. As it happens, however, the anecdotal information from Japanese bankers indicated that the rate
of discrepancies in transactions coming into Japan, although much less uniform, was relatively low. See Fuji
Bank Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at 3) (20-30% discrepancy rate on Japanese import transactions) ;
Sumitomo Interview, supra note 50 (transcript at 2) (25% discrepancy rate on Japanese import transactions).
Somewhat inconsistently with the other data, another Jap anese bank (on condition of anonymity) reported a
discrepancy rate on import transactions of 67%. Anonymous Japanese Bank Interview, supra note 50
(transcript at 2-3). As suggested above, however, the lower Japanese discrepancy figures also might be
attributable to differing standards of document examination. See supra note 50. I hope to collect more data in
Japan this fall to provide some understanding of the relevant country-specific differences.
59. Because I did not examine export-side transactions in the files of any overseas banks, I have no
direct observation of that rate.
60. That two-tiered understanding of my data is corroborated by a similar (although slightly more
discrepant) set of figures provided to me under condition of anonymity from a banker at a major Northeastern
bank. His data suggested that the highest rate of discrepancy (60% in his portfolio) is on incoming import
transactions, that there is a lower discrep ancy rate (50%) on outgoing export transactions, and that his bank
cures about half (25%) of the export discrepancies before the documents are forwarded overseas. See Telecopy
from Second Major Northeast Banker 1 (Sept. 21, 1999) [copy on file with author].
61. My expectation was supported by the views of the drafters of the UCP, who report that “[s]ome
surveys indicate that approximately fifty percent of the documents presented under the Documentary Credit
are rejected because of discrepancies or apparent discrepancies.” UCP preface, at 4. In hindsight I can make
that statement correct by interpreting the reference to “reject[ion]” to mean only a determination of
discrepancy, but before I did this study I interpreted it to mean rejection in the sense of refusal to accept.

MLR R EVISED G ALLEYS1.DOC

August 2000]

05/03/00 12:36 PM

Letters of Credit as Verification Institutions

419

refuse payment, it permitted payment of 94% of the agreed amount.62 Thus, in the
500 letter-of-credit transactions examined, the applicant never refused payment on
the letter of credit.63 The data doesn’t vary from assertions by bankers involved in
the industry; every interview subject with whom I spoke about payment refusal
claimed that applicants would refuse payments in less than one percent of the
discrepant files.64
Even more surprising than the rate of waiver was how quickly applicants
waived defaults. Several bankers suggested that applicants — even if they
ultimately permit payment — commonly delay payment for a significant period of
time to reflect dissatisfaction with the beneficiary’s performance in the transaction.
But the data suggest that applicants generally waived promptly. Of the 196 import
files with discrepancies, the applicant in more than half of the files — 103 (53%) —
waived the discrepancies within one business day after the issuer contacted the
applicant about the discrepancy. By one week after the issuer contacted the
applicant, they waived discrepancies in 165 (84%) of the files.65 By four weeks after
the issuer contacted the applicant, only six files (3%) remained unaccepted.
62. Profile 457. That transaction included some defects that did not demonstrably indicate contractual
defaults: expiration, late presentation, a missing document (one counterpart of a purchase order), and a
defective document (technically inaccurate shipping terms). It also included, however, a late shipment, which
normally would reflect a default on the underlying contract.
63. In all of my files, the banks immediately paid upon receipt of the waiver. It is, however, the view of
the industry that the bank is not bound by the waiver issued by its customer the applicant. See ICC, M ORE
QUERIES AND RESPONSES ON UCP 500: 1997 , at 14 (1997) (Response 254) (“In the event that discrepancies are
observed in a presentation of documents and the issuing bank [gives adequate notice of the discrepancies], the
issuing bank is under no obli gation to take up the documents, even if a proper waiver of the discrepancies is
received from the applicant.”); ICC, M ORE QUERIES AND RESPONSES ON UCP 500: 1997, at 28 (1997) (Response
267) (“The receipt of a waiver from the appli cant, either direct or via the beneficiary, does not bind the issuing
bank to accept the documents. The decision of whether or not to comply with the waiver is one for the
issuing bank to decide in its sole judgment.”). It appears that the only substantial reason that a bank would
decline to accept such a waiver would be doubts about its ability to obtain reimbursement from the applicant.
See Second Major Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at 6-7).
64. See Foreign Bank Site Visit Notes, supra note 44, at 1 (estimating three refusals each year out of
10,000 presentations, for a rate of .03%); Telephone Interview with executive from Bank Number 5 (Oct. 8,
1999) [transcript on file with author] [hereinafter Major Northeast Bank Interview] (transcript at 10) (“I
would have said it was a small fraction of one percent.”); Telephone Interview with Vice President, Technical
Consultant for Global Trade Services, Major Midwest Bank (July 19, 1999) (interview conducted on
condition of anonymity) [transcript on file with author] [hereinafter Major Midwest Bank Telephone
Interview] (transcript at 7) (“I would say ninety-nine percent of the documents [that are di screpant are
paid].”); Second Major Northeast Bank Telephone Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at 5) (“[A]t the end of
the day ninety-nine point nine percent of the documents they present, whether they carry discrepancies or not,
are paid.”); Second Major Northeast Bank Telephone Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at 17) (banker who
does 100,000 transactions a year suggesting that “I would be very comfortable in just guessing [that the
number of rejected documents per year is] less than a hundred. It may be less than ten.”); West-Coast Bank
Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at 7) (agreeing with my expectation of finding only one or two refused
presentations in my five-hundred file study).
The pattern appears to be similar in Japan. See Anonymous Japanese Bank Interview, supra note 50
(transcript at 7) (suggesting rejection of about ten documents out of a monthly volume of 17,000 transactions);
Fuji Bank Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at 9) (reporting rejection of documents or reduction of amount
to be paid in about ten out of every 18,000 transactions); Sumitomo Interview, supra note 50 (transcript at 4)
(suggesting rejection of ten documents out of a monthly volume of one thousand noncomplying transactions).
65. One week (five business days) serves as a rough guide of a timely response, because the issuer
generally needs to respond to the bank that presented the documents within seven business days after it
receives the documents. See UCP art. 13(b) (calling for a response within “a reasonable time, not to exceed
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As a practice of accommodation in transactions among long-time partners, the
rate and pace of waivers might seem commonplace. But as we see below, many
letters of credit are used in one-shot transactions or other contexts where relational
constraints have less force, precisely because of the lack of confidence in the
relationship.66 In those contexts, that rate of waiver seems truly startling.
III. W HY LETTERS OF C REDIT?
The data presented in Part I display an odd and puzzling picture. Commercial
parties pay substantial fees to banks to use letters of credit in their transactions.67
The beneficiaries then usually submit documents that do not conform — which
jeopardizes their right to payment under the letter — but the applicants then almost
universally waive the defects with startling haste, notwithstanding the frequent
contractual defaults displayed on the face of the documents presented by the seller.
The remainder of this Article offers some tentative explanations for that
pattern. Given the worldwide use of the commercial letter of credit, and its use in a
wide variety of contexts, no single explanation captures all of the motivations for its
use. The information collected in this study does, however, allow me to make
some progress in understanding the transactions. Thus, this Part of the Article
begins in Section A by rejecting the idea that businesses use letters of credit because
of some sub-optimal path dependence or mistake. Section B then critically assesses
the payment-assurance story, concluding that it cannot provide a general
explanation, but likely continues to play some role, especially in relation-deprived
uses of letters of credit. Finally, Section C offers two new justifications for the use
of letters of credit, both of which turn on the ability of the issuer to verify to a third
party some present or future fact about the buyer or the transaction. None of the
explanations qualifies as a general, unified explanation for all of the transactions in
which businesses use commercial letters of credit. Taken together, however, they
provide a general picture of plausible motivations for much of the universe of
commercial letter-of-credit transactions.
A.

The Road Not Taken: Irrational Habit and Path Dependence

Perhaps no rational explanation elucidates the puzzle presented by the high
discrepancy rates: businesses use letters of credit not because of the benefits they

seven banking days”). If the issuer takes two business days to examine the documents, that would leave five
business days for the appli cant to decide whether it wishes to waive any discrepancies without preventing the
issuer from transmitting a timely acceptance of the documents. Of course, if the issuer does not receive a
waiver by the seventh business day, it still can pay later, by sending a notice rejecting the documents on the
seventh business day, followed by a later notice accepting the documents with discrepancies. For a thorough
discussion of typical practice, see International Finance Services Asso ciation, Statement of Practice: Reasonable
Time for Examination & Notice of Dishonor, in THE 1999 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LETTER OF CREDIT LAW & PRACTICE
311 (James E. Byrne ed.) .
66. See infra pp. 423-423 (discussing reasons why parties select letters of credit instead of other payment
mechanisms).
67. See M ANN, supra note 2, at 217. Because all methods of payment in cross-border transactions involve
some out-of-pocket transaction costs, the excess cost of the letter of credit is a bit less than that $2,500 figure.
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provide, but because of a combination of practical factors such as a failure to understand how letters of credit work in practice, along with some habit of usage. To put
it more directly, that perspective suggests that businesses buy letters of credit from
banks by mistake — because they always have — and that if they fully understood
the costs and benefits of letters of credit they would use alternate payment systems.
The mistake story cannot be rejected out of hand: businesses cannot have
perfect comprehension of everything that they do and surely they occasionally enter
into transactions on terms attributable to imperfections in their understanding.68
But two factors make me doubt the general applicability of the mistake theory.
First, the sophistication of the parties involved reduces the credibility of the
mistake theory. Many of the users of letters of credit are large and sophisticated
companies. In the study, for example, I reviewed the files of several prominent
discount retailers and department stores that obtained letters of credit to pay their
overseas suppliers. And they did not use letters of credit occasionally or haphazardly; on the contrary, the files clearly documented that those companies have
large letter-of-credit relationships covering a substantial portion of their sales
activity. 69 Absent some new evidence, it seems implausible that those companies
would organize such a large number of transactions in a way that systematically,
repeatedly, and pointlessly increases the cost of the transactions.
The larger framework of the institutions for providing payment in cross-border
sales transactions also casts doubt on the mistake explanation, because it shows that
businesses make a conscious and deliberate choice to select the letter of credit from
among a variety of competing payment institutions. Generally, sellers and buyers
can choose from four significantly different methods of providing payment in crossborder transactions. Ranging from most favorable to the seller to most favorable to
the buyer, the options include prepayment, payment by letter of credit, payment by
documentary collection, and open account.70
The first and the last are the simplest and cheapest, but create the greatest
possibility for opportunistic misconduct by the trading partner. In the prepayment
transaction, the buyer forwards payment before the seller ships the goods. In the
open-account transaction, the seller ships the goods without any formal assurance
that the buyer will forward payment when the goods arrive. Thus, in each of those
transactions one party first performs completely, trusting the other party to respond
by performing in turn.71

68. For comments to that effect in this context, see Fuji Bank Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at 1314) (discussing the lack of sophistication by smaller companies doing international trade and explaining that
“there’s a perception for the Japanese company that the LC is very credible, reliable. And once they receive
an LC they feel like they have completed the transaction.”); Second Major Northeast Bank Telephone
Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at 15, 17) (suggesting that customers focus on the fact that their letter-ofcredit transactions get paid rather than the risk of nonpayment).
69. The size of such a relationship was particularly evident at two of the banks (Banks 1 and 4), whose
file-numbering systems included a separate filing system — with separate numbers and file locations — for the
transactions of two prominent retailers that are their largest letter-of-credit customers. Each of those
customers provided, on a conservative estimate, more than 20% of the bank’s letter-of-credit work.
70. See Mid-Sized Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 56 (transcript at 6-7).
71. See Mid-Sized Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 56 (transcript at 6).
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In between those two polar choices lie two intermediate choices, the letter-ofcredit and documentary-collection transactions. Those transactions intertwine the
performance of the parties, with each party taking substantial steps toward
performance before either party completes its activities. In the letter-of-credit
transaction, as discussed above, the seller waits to ship until it receives a letter of
credit issued on behalf of the buyer. The buyer, in turn, withholds payment until it
receives adequate evidence that the shipment has occurred, as shown by the
documents required for payment under the letter of credit.
The documentary-collection transaction (or, commonly, a collection
transaction) is another intermediate option, cheaper but less protective of the seller
than the letter-of-credit transaction.72 The seller ships the goods without any
previous action by the buyer to effect payment, but a transport document
transmitted through banking channels covers the goods. In the typical (though not
universal) way of arranging the transaction, the buyer cannot obtain the document
of title, and thus cannot obtain the goods that the document covers, until it pays the
bank for the goods.73 The collection transaction favors the seller less than the letterof-credit transaction because the buyer has no obligation to take up the documents.74 Hence, the buyer might not be able to get the goods without paying for
them, but the seller cannot force the buyer to pay; if the buyer chooses not to pay,
that the seller must deal with goods that it has shipped to an overseas location, with
no local buyer for them.75 The collection transaction provides a more secure option
than an open-account transaction (where the buyer can get the goods without
paying for them), but not by much. Collection transactions, however, cost much

72. For a more detailed summary, see M ANN, supra note 2, at 457-66. For descriptions by a banker, see
Mid-Sized Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 56 (transcript at 6-7). Because two of the banks that I visited
maintained records on documentary-draft transactions at the same sites as they maintained letter-of-credit
records, I collected information on documentary-draft transactions at those sites (50 records at each bank for a
total of 100). Those records are in the same database as the other data.
73. See Mid-Sized Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 56 (transcript at 7 (“If the documents are titled
properly then no pay, no documents for merchandise.”). Two common variations use nonnegotiable
documents of title. In one, the goods are consigned to the co llecting bank; that has substantially the same
effect as a negotiable shipment, because the buyer usually must pay to acquire the goods. See Mid-Sized
Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 56 (transcript at 8-9). The other common variation, particularly in
shipments by air, uses nonnegotiable documents and ships directly to the buyer. In that transaction the buyer
can obtain the goods without paying the bank for them. See Mid-Sized Northeast Bank Interview, supra note
56 (transcript at 8). Thus, that transaction provides the seller little more protection than the open-account
transaction discussed above. The transactions proceeded in that less protective fashion in 33 out of the 96
(34%) collection transactions for which I could examine the relevant documents.
74. See Midwest Bank Interview, supra note 47 (transcript at 8) (“[A] collection raises the obligation of
absolutely nobody to do anything that they don’t want to do.”); West-Coast Bank Interview, supra note 44
(transcript at 13) (“[Y]ou’re completely putting yourself at the mercy of that party [i.e., the overseas buyer].”).
75. See Mid-Sized Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 56 (transcript at 7). Buyers declined to pay the
banks in 12 out of the 100 collection transactions. That 12% non-payment rate is striking compared to the
non-payment rate in the letter-of-credit transactions of less than one-tenth of one percent. The higher nonpayment rate would not surprise the bankers to whom I spoke about collection transactions. See, e.g., MidSized Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 56 (transcript at 12) (discussing difficulties of obtaining payment
in collection transactions) ; West-Coast Bank Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at 13-17) (same).
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less than a letter-of-credit transaction, with bank fees typically fixed in the range of
$100-$300, regardless of the size of the transaction.76
The available information makes it clear that parties can realistically and freely
choose among those four payment systems. Significantly, the choice suggests that
the letter of credit is not the automatic response of a custom-bound industry.
Businesses don’t use letters of credit indiscriminately out of habit. Rather, they
select them for transactions in which they do not have a good enough relationship
with the overseas party to justify engaging in collection or open-account
transactions. As one banker put it, “there has to be trust between the two before
you send the documents on collection.”77 Indeed, the best information I found
indicates that businesses use letters of credit in only about one-fifth of cross-border
sale-of-goods transactions coming into or out of the United States.78
The relatively low rate of use certainly does not suggest a market populated by
businesses that buy letters of credit for no good reason. On the contrary, it suggests
a market in which businesses use cheaper methods of payment whenever the
protections of the letter of credit fail to justify the cost, and, in which they select the
letter of credit only when they want its security. Generally, it suggests, businesses
use letters of credit in one-shot transactions where relational protections are
inapplicable, or in the opening stages of a potential long-term relationship, before
relational constraints become effective.
B.

The Classic Story : Assurance of Payment

The payment-assurance story provides the classic understanding of letters of
credit. In that story, the key benefit offered by the letter of credit is a right of

76. See Mid-Sized Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 56 (transcript at 15-16) (discussing the different
types of charges in letter-of-credit transactions and collection transa ctions); West-Coast Bank Interview, supra
note 44 (transcript at 12) (“[O]bviously the cost of a letter of credit is very much higher than a collection. Our
collection fees are low — very low in comparison. [Collections a]re not a big money maker and they’re
looked at more as a service to a customer instead of an actual money-making product.”); see also supra note 67
(discussing fees for letters of credit). [My estimate of the fees for collection transactions is based on my review
of the files in my dat abase.]
77. Midwest Bank Interview, supra note 47 (transcript at 8); see Mid-Sized Northeast Bank Interview,
supra note 56 (transcript at 19-20) (discussing reasons why parties choose collection transactions instead of
letters of credit); West-Coast Bank Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at 12) (“[T]he only reason [collection
transactions] exist is because there’s a great deal of . . . trust between the parties concerned or in some cases
people just would rather take the risk than pay the initial letter-of-credit fees, which can get pretty
expensive.“). For a similar view from a knowledgeable academic, see John F. Dolan, Letters of Credit : A
Comparison of UCP 500 and the New U.S. Article 5, [1999] J. BUS. L. 521, 528 (“Thus the commercial letter of
credit arises most often between parties that know little of each other or are in distant markets and when at
least one party is located in a developing country.”).
78. One banker reported to me two sources of data in his possession. The data that he considered more
reliable suggested that 13% of such transactions were done by letters of credit, 72% by open account, 4% by
documentary collections, and 2% by cash in advance. Another source (that he considered less accurate)
reported 29% letters of credit, 52% open account, 12% cash in advance, and 7% documentary collections. See
Interview with Group Vice President and Head of Trade Services Product Management, International Trade
& Advisory Group, Bank Number 4 (Sept. 2, 1999) (location not disclosed to protect anonymity of bank)
[transcript on file with author] [hereinafter Foreign Bank Interview] (transcript at 13). Whichever figures are
closer to reality, however, both figures suggest that letters of credit are not used routinely without regard to
cost.
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payment enforceable against the issuer. That right largely removes the risk of the
open-account transaction — that the seller will ship its goods first and that the
buyer, once in possession, will withhold payment from the seller. Put another way,
the letter of credit exchanges the typically uncertain obligation of a buyer to pay for
something received for an absolute obligation of a financial institution.
Part II demonstrates that the payment-assurance method fails to explain the
general use of letters of credit. The payment-assurance story makes sense only if
the seller generally expects to use the letter of credit to force the issuer to pay. But
as the data suggest, an experienced seller would understand that it usually cannot
force payment from the issuer, because it usually will not submit documents that
comply with the letter of credit. Thus, in many if not most cases, the seller’s right
to payment will depend entirely — at least as a legal matter — on the grace of the
buyer in waiving the discrepancies in the documents submitted by the seller.
To be sure, a weaker version of the payment-assurance story may supply a
better fit with a high rate of discrepancies. For example, if letters of credit cost
little, if sophisticated sellers expect buyers to renege and try to withhold payment
quite rarely, and if it is expensive to submit documents that comply, then rational
sellers might use letters of credit generally, but accept a high rate of discrepancy,
just to keep the letter of credit in reserve for the rare cases in which buyers try not to
pay.
Indeed, the information I collected about cure efforts suggests that I incorrectly
assumed that high discrepancy rates are inconsistent with some payment-assurance
rationale. Most obviously, the existence of substantial cure efforts, illustrated by
my discussion above of American export-side banks,79 indicates that exporters and
the banks that serve them see significant value in producing documents that
comply. Importantly, the rate of discrepancy correlates with a high degree of
significance to the size of the letter of credit.80 If compliance of the documents was
not significant, then parties would not try harder to produce compliant documents
in larger transactions.81
The pattern of cure efforts underscores that correlation. On the one hand,
although again based on the limited data in the study, the largest cure efforts appear
in the context — exports from the United States to overseas buyers — in which
parties generally use letters of credit to compensate for the absence of strong
relations between the buyer and the seller. Conversely, cure efforts seem much
weaker on imports into the United States. Again, generalizing with caution,
concerns about the reliability of the American importer might be less substantial.82
Finally and most interestingly, the single context in which I saw parties dispensing
entirely with cure efforts — purchasing letters of credit sold at a lower price and
79. See supra pp. 412-415.
80. The correlation is quite weak, but it is significant at the .007 level. See infra Statist ical Appendix.
81. It is possible that the documents required in larger transactions are simpler, and that the higher rate
of compliance is a function of those easier requirements rather than greater compliance efforts. As I state in
the Statistical Appendix, infra note 140, I do not have the data to test that question, but it does seem most
unlikely to me.
82. I offer in section III(C)(2) a reason for letter of credit usage independent from those relation-based
concerns.
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processed without any export-side review of the documents at all — involves
transactions importing goods into the United States.83
To be sure, I cannot credit the payment-assurance effect as anything but a
relatively weak factor. The large frequency of easily curable defects in the files that
I examined suggests that it cannot be all that important to provide complying
documents. Defects that the bank can cause the seller to cure generally could have
been avoided more cheaply in the first place. To use a common example from the
files that I examined, surely a seller would save money writing a draft correctly the
first time rather than writing a defective draft, paying the bank’s discrepancy fee,84
and then taking the time and effort a week later (after prodding by the bank) to
produce a compliant draft. Even experienced and careful sellers would make
mistakes from time to time, which banks would catch, but a universe in which
banks can cure defects in more than one-fourth (27%, 68 out of 250 export files) of
the presentations made to them is not a universe populated by diligent sellers trying
hard to avoid obvious mistakes.
In sum, I believe, again based on the limited data, that assurance of payment
must remain part of the story of letters of credit, but that it provides an incomplete
reason for their use. To tell the whole story, we must look also for some other
benefit to the seller that obtains a letter of credit.
C.

The Letter of Credit as a Verification Institution

If the letter of credit adds real value to the underlying transactions, and if a
right of payment enforceable against the issuer cannot explain the value, then the
value must come from something else provided by the bank that issues the letter of
credit on behalf of the buyer. As a matter of transactional design, the bank provides
some sort of “verification” of information that it can assess better than any of the
other parties to the transaction.85 The points of difficulty lie in identifying precisely
what the bank verifies and why the parties need the bank to verify it. Given the
limited scope of the data collected to date (which includes no information about the
nature of the customers or their relations with the banks or their transaction
partners), I can only speculate at this point. Still, I can identify two separate
justifications for use of the commercial letter of credit as a verification institution:
verifying to the seller the likelihood that the buyer will pay and verifying to the
government the legitimacy of the transaction.
1.

Verifying the Likelihood that the Buyer Will Pay

In my view, the implicit verification of the applicant’s reliability and probity
that the issuer makes when it issues the letter of credit generally explains the
83. See supra note 44 (discussing that product as available to businesses shipping goods from Asia to the
United States); infra note 132 (same).
84. At the banks that I visited, discrepant presentations universally were assessed a fee, which ranged
from a low of $25 to a high of $75.
85. I organize my observations here using the framework I previously have developed to discuss thirdparty “verification institutions.” See Mann, supra note 14, at 2265-71.
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common usage of letters of credit. Structurally, that verification furnishes a classic
example of reputational intermediation: the applicant/buyer “rents” the issuer’s
reputation to allow the beneficiary/seller to verify the credibility of the
applicant/buyer’s promise to make payment when the seller ships the goods.86
Central to that arrangement, of course, is the availability of a reputational
sanction against the bank that issues the letter of credit. On that score, I take it as
given that banks generally have a strong reputational interest in their letter-of-credit
businesses.87 For that explanation to make sense, however, I need to examine three
separate characteristics of the transactions in which the letter of credit is used: the
relative ease of verifying the reliability of a foreign bank as opposed to a foreign
trading partner; the plausibility of treating a bank that issues a letter of credit as
vouching for the future performance of its client the applicant; and the information
that the bank is in a position to provide. I address those problems in turn.
a. Why Evaluate the Bank Instead of the Buyer? The bank helps to solve the
information problem that faces a seller of goods to a foreign buyer when the seller
attempts to estimate the likelihood that the buyer opportunistically will attempt to
withhold payment in the transaction after the seller ships the goods. Efforts to
assess the reputation of the buyer directly often will be expensive and ineffective.88
For one thing, the buyer’s location in a foreign country makes it more costly to
collect information than if the buyer were located in the same country as the
seller.89 As one banker put it, letters of credit are not as useful in same-country
transactions because “it’s easier to get a credit report cheaper than to force
somebody to give them a letter of credit.”90 Also, even if the information is
available, it may be less reliable to the seller than information collected in the
seller’s own country.91 Similarly, differences in accounting systems from country to
country generate difficulties in the assessment of any objective financial

86. The classic explanation of reputational intermediation appears in Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H.
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 618-21 (1984) (discussing reputational
intermediation in the issuance of securities); see also Mann, supra note 14, at 2269-71 (generali zing that idea).
87. The best anecdote I heard about the significance of bank reputation in the letter-of-credit context
involved Chinese banks that were barred by the Chinese government from using hard currency to honor
previously issued letters of credit. Notwithstanding the plenary control of the government over bank activities
in mainland China, the officers at those banks still used a variety of arrangements — offsets against overseas
funds and the like — to do the best they could to provide timely payment on the letters of credit that they had
issued. See Foreign Bank Interview, supra note 78 (transcript at 3-4).
88. For a theoretical discussion of reasons why it is difficult for many countries to develop effective
systems for disseminating credible information about their businesses, see Bernard S. Black, The Legal and
Institutional Preconditions for Strong Stock Markets : The Nontriviality of Securities Law (unpublished Sept. 1999
manuscript) [copy on file with author].
89. See Foreign Bank Interview, supra note 78 (transcript at 4) (“If you’re selling to somebody outside
the United States it’s very difficult to get good credit information so you try to go to [Dun & Bradstreet] or
whatever you can. But, you get very sketchy inform ation.”); Major Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 64
(transcript at 7).
90. Midwest Bank Interview, supra note 47 (transcript at 5).
91. See Foreign Bank Interview, supra note 78 (transcript at 5) (pointing out that Dun & Bradstreet
collects information on foreign companies, but suggesting that “companies in another country are not so
concerned [as American companies] about [the validity of the information that they provide Dun &
Bradstreet]”).
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information that the seller might obtain. Moreover, the sheer number of potential
trading partners worldwide makes the task of maintaining any knowledge of
financial strength and probity daunting at best.
Although those problems create similar difficulties in the assessment of the
financial strength and credibility of foreign banks, foreign parties can much more
easily evaluate foreign letter-of-credit banks than they can evaluate foreign trading
partners.92 For one thing, the universe of reputable letter-of-credit banks is much
smaller than the universe of trading partners: in most countries only a few banks
participate in the global letter-of-credit arena. Thus, parties can obtain much more
information about those banks.93 Second, large banks in the relevant markets more
often follow internationally comprehensible accounting conventions than the great
mass of trading businesses in the foreign country; thus, analysts in the seller’s
country can more easily assess information about the buyer’s bank than
information about the buyer itself.94 Third, especially for smaller countries with less
stable financial conditions, regulatory authorities more often provide close
supervision of the affairs of banks than they do of the affairs of the large number of
trading businesses in the country.95
Taken together, those conditions all work together to make it considerably
easier for analysts in the seller’s country to form a confident opinion of the
reliability of the buyer’s bank than of the buyer itself. That opinion can be in the
formal nature of a published rating96 or it can be less formal periodic updates that a
local bank provides its larger customers97 or even episodic comments about banks
involved in particular transactions.98 Regardless of the opinion’s form, parties
92. See Second Major Northeast Bank Telephone Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at 14) (“When
we’re asked to confirm a credit — we’re making that decision for the most part based on the bank. . . . We
understand the bank and we know the bank and we have a rel ationship with the bank and we may not have a
relationship or know the importer.”).
93. See Foreign Bank Interview, supra note 78 (transcript at 5) (“[T]here’s an awful lot publicized.
There’s a lot you can read in The Economist or other periodicals, magazines, things about the creditworthiness
of various banks and the countries that they’re in.”).
94. See Foreign Bank Interview, supra note 78 (transcript at 5-6) (“Banks are much more standardized in
the way that they do their accounting. . . . [T]hey’re also going to be doing a lot of international activities so
there’s going to be a lot of pressure on them from correspondent banks they are doing busi ness with to state
their numbers according to gene rally accepted accounting principles.”).
95. See Foreign Bank Interview, supra note 78 (transcript at 5) (“[I]t’s also quite true that countries are
very sensitive — or at least traditionally very sensitive — to keeping all of their banks running. So, as long as
the country itself is in good condition it’s very unlikely that a bank will go bankrupt. . . . [Y]ou can’t depend
on that completely but it’s a much better risk than a corporate risk.”). That observation does not apply, of
course, to the United States and other countries sufficiently confident in their financial systems to allow bank
failures to provide market discipline. For discussion of some of the difficulties that regulators face in
permitting bank failures, see Curtis J. Milhaupt, Japan’s Experience with Deposit Insurance and Failing Banks:
Implications for Financial Regulatory Design? , 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 399 (1999); Geoffrey P. Miller, Is Deposit
Insurance Inevitable? Lessons from Argentina, 16 INT ’L REV. L. & ECON. 211 (1996).
96. See Foreign Bank Interview, supra note 78 (transcript at 6) (discussing such a pub lication); Midwest
Bank Interview, supra note 47 (transcript at 6) (discussing ratings agencies that rate foreign banks).
97. See Foreign Bank Interview, supra note 78 (transcript at 6) (discussing the avai lability of such
updates).
98. See Foreign Bank Interview, supra note 78 (transcript at 6) (discussing the bank’s willingness to
provide that information); Mid-Sized Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 56 (transcript at 18) (describing
requests for such information). The importance of reliable information is underscored by the common
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involved in letter-of-credit transactions maintain constant vigilance over the
activities of the foreign banks with whom they deal,99 and that vigilance seems
much more effective than any comparable monitoring of the actual trading
partners.100
b. Does the Bank Vouch for the Buyer? Although a seller considering a
transaction in a foreign country can verify the reliability of the foreign bank more
readily than it can the reliability of the foreign merchant, what significant
information about the foreign merchant does the foreign bank convey when it
issues the letter of credit? After all, the foreign bank does not accept any financial
responsibility for the actions of its customer, the buyer (except in the indirect sense
that the bank is obligated to pay when the documents in fact comply). Specifically,
and perhaps more to the point, the bank does not undertake even to encourage the
buyer to waive any discrepancies that might undermine the bank’s obligation to pay
the seller for the shipment.
By the time I finished collecting the information for the study, I became
persuaded that banks effectively vouch for their customers when they issue letters of
credit for them.101 For one thing, some bankers directly stated that the bank’s
reputation was at risk whenever their customers refuse to waive discrepancies in
presentations seeking payment on letters of credit.102 One explained:
[B]anks are very sensitive to their credibility.

It doesn’t mean they won’t reject

practice of an American bank seeking confirm ation from another American bank of a letter of credit issued by
an overseas bank with which the first American bank is not adequately familiar. See Mid-Sized Northeast
Bank Interview, supra note 56 (transcript at 18-19); Midwest Bank Interview, supra note 47 (transcript at 6);
see also Major Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 64 (transcript at 4) (discussing the value to a Hong Kong
bank of having a letter of credit issued by its North American corr espondent).
99. See Mid-Sized Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 56 (transcript at 16-17) (discussing
unwillingness to continue processing letters of credit issued by banks whose customers fail to waive
discrepancies in a timely manner); Second Major North east Bank Telephone Interview, supra note 44
(transcript at 13) (discussing calls from other bankers about the interview subject’s willingness to confirm
letters of credit issued by lesser-known foreign banks); West-Coast Bank Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at
9-10) (explaining that confirmation by a United States bank of a letter of credit issued by a foreign bank with
which he is not familiar would assuage concerns about the reliability of the foreign bank and its customer).
100. For that reason I am puzzled by Clay Gillette’s argument in his comment on this paper that a
system that can impose reputational sanctions on banks should be able to impose reputational sanctions on
buyers as well. See Gillette, supra note 31, at ????- ????. As I understand the dynamic, there are relatively few
banks in the industry in each country and the banks serve as intermediaries on both sides of the transaction —
collecting information about the buyers for whom they issue letters of credit and about the banks whose letters
of credit they process. I see no reason why the export-side bank should be lax in that process simply because
it is an adviser rather than a confirmer — the exporting customer expects to get paid either way and will be
unhappy if the overseas bank and its customer reject documents after the goods have been shipped.
101. See Foreign Bank Interview, supra note 78 (transcript at 5) (suggesting that issu ance of a letter of
credit provides a “credit reference” and agreeing that the reference extends not only to financial strength but
also to general probity); Midwest Bank Interview, supra note 47 (transcript at 6) (“If you have an issuing bank
that is of a certain reputation and class and standing it’s not a difficult leap of faith to say that the customers
that they’re issuing letters of credits on behalf of — that . . . the customer is worthy of that extension of
credit.”); West-Coast Bank Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at 10) (“[T]hat a bank in India will issue a
credit for this importer . . . says they must think highly of them.”).
102. Foreign Bank Interview, supra note 78 (transcript at 7) (“We’re very uncomfortable whenever we
do refuse a set of documents. So even though I guess we’re pretty willing to find discrepancies and call a
customer up and say, ‘These are all the discrepancies,’ . . . [w]e want them to waive all those discrepancies. If
they are going to refuse . . . we want it to be based on good grounds for refusal.”).
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documents when documents are presented that do not conform to the letter of credit.
They’ll do that but they’re very sensitive about having the letters of credit not paid
when they are supposed to be paid.103

Indeed, several bankers — especially those to whom I spoke in Japan —
reported that they “persuade[d]” or “pressure[d]” their customers to waive the
discrepancies in any case in which the seller’s performance was not seriously
defective.104
Several bankers, however, insisted that they would not engage in such efforts,
pointing out that their customers are entitled to insist that the bank adhere strictly
to the terms of the letter of credit.105 But a deeper examination of the practices of
those bankers suggests that even they are vouching for their customers, albeit in a
subtle and indirect manner.106 The dispositive point for me is the consistent
statements of sophisticated letter-of-credit bankers that they will not issue letters of
credit indiscriminately. All of the bankers with whom I discussed the topic agreed,
in one way or another, that they engage in a serious screening process of customers
for whom they issue letters of credit.107 Although the customer’s ability to
reimburse the bank for any payments that it makes on letters that it issues on the
customer’s behalf is necessary , it plainly is not sufficient: the process (like much of
commercial banking) involves broader questions of general commercial probity and
“character.” 108 One banker put it aptly: “There’s more than just the money. You
103. Mid-Sized Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 56 (transcript at 17).
104. See Anonymous Japanese Bank Interview, supra note 50 (transcript at 5) (“[W]e do not force them,
but we ask them very persuasively to pay immediately.”); Fuji Bank Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at 10)
(“To suspend the payment sometimes sends a neg ative message for the bank.”); Fuji Bank Interview, supra
note 44 (transcript at 11) (discussing efforts to persuade customers to waive defects); Sumitomo Interview,
supra note 50 (transcript at 8) (“[I]f there is some slight discrepancy then of course we try to persuade them to
pay for the draft.”). I do not mean to suggest a peculiar Japanese attitude, only that the Japanese attitude
differs from the American attitude. My only possible source of direct information on the attitudes of bankers
from countries other than the United States and Japan would be my work at foreign-owned banks in the
United States. My impression — which might be worth little — is that the foreign-owned banks that I visited
were not substantially influenced in the “culture” of their letter-of-credit departments by their foreign
ownership. It is true, however, that the only American banker willing to admit to a similar practice was at an
American office of a foreign bank. He explained: “We’d tell them that they’re playing games and we’ve
actually told customers to take their business elsewhere if they’re going to do that. . . . So, we try to put as
much pressure on them as possible and say, ‘You’ve got to pay.’” Foreign Bank Interview, supra note 78
(transcript at 9).
105. See Major Midwest Bank Telephone Interview, supra note 64 (transcript at 8) (“We don’t urge our
clients to pay. That’s the client’s deci sion.”); Mid-Sized Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 56 (transcript
at 14); West-Coast Bank Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at 3).
106. See Foreign Bank Interview, supra note 78 (transcript at 4) (describing the significance of “[t]he fact
that a bank is willing to issue a letter of credit for somebody”); West-Coast Bank Interview, supra note 44
(transcript at 9) (“[T]he fact that a bank will issue a letter of credit tells me something about the credit
standing of that customer which gives me a good feeling.”). One banker agreed that many bankers make such
a “quantum leap of faith,” but that it is “unwarranted.” He explained that point by identifying several
reasons why one bank might be willing to issue a letter of credit for a weak applicant, which would not justify
a second bank in relying on the applicant. Second Major Northeast Bank Tel ephone Interview, supra note 44
(transcript at 13-14).
107. See, e.g., Midwest Bank Interview, supra note 47 (transcript at 7) (“[S]imply because somebody
comes in and asks you to issue a letter of credit you’re not going to do it.”).
108. See Major Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 64 (transcript at 4-5) (“U.S. banks in general will
not deal with clients who are disreputable, who are dishonest, whose management is not known to them, who
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know, what’s their performance history? What’s their business history? What are
their markets? . . . [T]here’s a whole assessment done of the business aspects. . . .
It’s not whether you have ten bucks to put up for the credit.”109
The behavior of banks backed up these statements; a bank that became
convinced that a customer was acting opportunistically with respect to its trading
partners would consider ceasing to issue letters of credit for that customer. More
than one banker reported incidents in which the banker refused to continue dealing
with major, profitable customers because of dissatisfaction with the business
dealings of the customer.110 Most importantly, several bankers acknowledged that
one notable type of malfeasance that would undermine the willingness to continue
a relationship would be a pattern of refusing to waive discrepancies in letter-ofcredit transactions111 that went beyond normal behavior for the particular industry
in question112 (with the garment industry being notorious for a custom of
footdragging).113 One banker described a typical confrontation on that point as
follows:
are in and out of bankruptcy, who are acting in an unethical and dishonest manner.”); see also ERIC N.
COMPTON , PRINCIPLES OF BANKING 284 (1991) (discussing “the five Cs of credit,” the first of which is “character
of the borrower”).
109. Midwest Bank Interview, supra note 47 (transcript at 7).
110. See Foreign Bank Interview, supra note 78 (transcript at 10) (“[W]e don’t like doing business with
people like that. We sometimes get ourselves into big arguments with the relationship managers because they
want to do the business. . . . [T]hey say ‘Oh, it’s a great credit relationship.’ And we say, ‘Well, tell them to
take their letters of credit somewhere else then because we just don’t want to be associated with people like
this.’”); West-Coast Bank Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at 11) (“In particular — I know that our people
are very stringent on who they grant credit to because I’ve seen a lot of their customers leave or be asked to
leave.”).
111. See Second Major Northeast Bank Telephone Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at 7) (explaining
that the letter-of-credit department would bring to the attention of a client’s relationship manager any pattern
of delays in waiving discrepancies on letters of credit). For a similar sentiment from Japan, see Anonymous
Japanese Bank Interview, supra note 50 (transcript at 11) (suggesting that his bank does not experience
substantial problems with failure to waive discrepancies because of the quality of companies with which his
bank deals).
112. As more than one banker emphasized, some industries (most notably the garment industry, see infra
note 113) are characterized by lengthy delays in waiver of discrepancies on letters of credit. But that does not
mean that bankers are reluctant to issue letters of credit in that industry; rather, it means that they are more
tolerant of delays than they would be in other industries. Even there, however, issuers would cease to do
business with an otherwise profitable customer if it began imposing pre-waiver delays that were longer than
customary. See Major Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 64 (transcript at 5-6) (“If I saw a transaction that
broke an industry pattern it would raise eyebrows, it would raise a red flag for me and I hope whatever bank
that was involved that was handling it.”); Second Major Northeast Bank Telephone Interview, supra note 44
(transcript at 18-19) (“If we had an importer who was doing this [i.e., refusing to waive discrepancies in a
timely manner] on a regular basis and it was outside the norm then I guess that would be it.”).
113. It seems to be common in the garment industry for importers to delay their acceptance of
discrepant documents by lengthy periods of time on the order of a month. See Major Northeast Bank
Interview, supra note 64 (transcript at 1-3); Second Major Northeast Bank Telephone Interview, supra note 44
(transcript at 18) (“We have customers here who have money who I think will jerk beneficiaries around given
the opportunity because it’s the nature of the trade they’re in. It’s the nature of the rag business.”); Notes
from Site Visit to Bank Number 2, at 1 (August 4, 1999 — Aug. 5, 1999) [copy on file with author]; WestCoast Bank Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at 3). Indeed, many bankers believe that garment-industry
letters of credit are designed by the American importers to be especially complex for the purpose of enhancing
the likelihood of discrepancies. See West-Coast Bank Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at 8) (“Garmenttype credits are . . . notorious for discrepancies because of the text of the credits going out. They’re so detailed
with regard to merchandise description. It just gives an opportunity for greater mistakes to be made”). To be
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We’d tell them that they’re playing games and we’ve actually told customers to take
their business elsewhere if they’re going to do that. . . . So, we try to put as much
pressure on them as possible and say, “You’ve got to pay.” And if they say “No, no,
no I’m not gonna pay and I don’t care what you say,” we say, “We don’t want to do
business with somebody like you.”114

Similarly, another banker talked at length about his unwillingness to issue
letters of credit with “built-in” discrepancies — letters of credit that the seller could
not possibly satisfy:
I tell you seriously, when we have clients, we have on occasion had discussions with
clients who say “I want you to issue a letter of credit with built-in discrepancies
because I want to make sure that the beneficiary cannot present documents and get
paid immediately” and we decline to do that. And if they insist and threaten to close
the account we will close the account for them because if they are going to act in that
kind of a manner toward their trading partner overseas then what is there to make me
think they will not act in the same unethical manner in their relationship with me their
banker. I have been involved at this end with other banks where we literally have gone
to a customer who’s complaining because we’re not putting built-in discrepancies in
their letters of credit and have carried a check with me and closed their account on the
spot.115
c. What Does the Bank’s Verification Say About the Buyer? The last difficulty lies
in identifying precisely what the bank implies (for it certainly states nothing
expressly) about its letter of credit customers. It seems implausible that the bank
offers something as imprecise as a general credit reference along the lines of “this is
the kind of customer that always pays.” If so, then we would expect to see an even
smaller rate of nonpayment in the transactions in which buyers have graduated to
documentary-collection transactions from letter-of-credit transactions.116 But my
limited data suggests precisely the opposite: a nonpayment rate of about 10% in
documentary-collection transactions117 compared to a nonpayment rate in letter of

sure, the limited willingness to accept discrepant documents is attributed in part to the greater likelihood that
even slight delays in shipment or slight nonconformities of the product will have an effect on the underlying
commercial transaction. For example, a fall line of clothes that arrives two months late in December is more
likely to have a diminished value than a part needed to repair a broken machine that arrives after a similar
delay. See Mid-Sized Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 56 (transcript at 1-2).
The delays that those importers impose on discrepant documents usually are followed by waiver of the
discrepancies and full payment on the letter of credit, but there also seems to be an expectation of negotiation
outside the letter-of-credit process that might result in other concessions not apparent from the bank’s files.
See West-Coast Bank Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at 3). Moreover, the delays that are typical for the
industry appear to be taken into account in the pricing of the transactions in the first instance. See Major
Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 64 (transcript at 6):
It is not up to me to determine what kind of a deal the buyer and the seller strike and when I started in this
business 28 years ago, I was horrified to learn of some of these things until I discovered that, well yes, but in
the rag trade coming from this part of the world that the vendors figure it’s a forty-three day delay when they
are dealing with Company A. They know that and they build it into their prices.
114. Foreign Bank Interview, supra note 78 (transcript at 9).
115. Major Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 64 (transcript at 4).
116. See supra pp. 423-423 (discussing the choice businesses make between letter-of-credit transactions
and documentary-collection transactions).
117. See supra note 75 (reporting data on that point).
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credit transactions about 100 times smaller, on the order of one tenth of one
percent.
Thus, the bank must assert something tied more directly to the letter-of-credit
transaction, probably a general prediction that the buyer will perform according to
industry norms in the letter-of-credit transaction.118 That prediction — and the
parties’ need to get the prediction from the bank — rest on two distinct features of
the issuing bank’s relations with the buyer. The first is the essentially predictive
point discussed above: the bank’s ability based on its past interactions with the
buyer to assess the buyer’s general probity. The second is a leverage-related point:
the bank’s understanding that it can influence the buyer’s behavior on the particular
question at issue, the buyer’s willingness to waive discrepancies. However
unconstrained the buyer’s legal right to reject the documents may be, the buyer will
often disappoint the bank if the buyer rejects documents that include discrepancies
that normally would be waived in the industry in question.119 And if the buyer
knows that the bank will be “disappointed” by the buyer’s conduct, the buyer may
refrain from the conduct absent dire countervailing pressures.120 From the
perspective of the seller, the ability of the bank to influence the conduct of the
overseas buyer might comprise the most important aspect of the letter of credit.
* * * * *
In sum, in addition to the classic explanation — that the issuer will pay in those
cases in which the seller presents compliant documents — I posit a second
explanation — that the issuer is confident based on past experience or its
expectation of future leverage that the buyer “voluntarily” will choose to pay
whether or not the documents comply. That explanation, however, doesn’t carry
equal weight as a general explanation for the use of letters of credit in transactions
exporting goods into the United States. In inbound transactions, sellers have
access to a considerable amount of apparently reliable information about the buyers
in question, particularly the large retailers that were prominent in the data.121
Certainly, many overseas exporters have similar concerns about the reliability
of their American customers, but the explanation presented in this section does not
118. See supra notes 111-112 and accompanying text (discussing evidence suggesting that banks would
stop dealing with customers that refuse to follow industry norms in waiving discrepancies in presentations on
letters of credit).
119. The ready willingness to impose nonlegal sanctions on a trading partner for insisting upon
something that is entirely lawful reminds me of the sanctions that Lisa Bernstein discusses for “laying down
on a contract” in her discussion of the cotton industry. See Bernstein, supra note 1, at ????- ????. I have no firm
answer for the deeper question — why does the bank sanction the buyer that refuses payment in a transaction
supported by a letter of credit but not in a transaction supported only by documentary-collection
arrangements? — but the most likely answer seems to be a general understanding of the issuer that its
reputation is on the line for presentations against its letters of credit to be honored, where its reputation is
completely disengaged from the results of a documentary-collection transaction. See supra note 74 (reporting
the relatively lackadaisical attitude of banks to nonpayment in documentary-collection transactions).
120. See Mann, supra note 14, at 2261-62 (suggesting that the same analysis is a common justification for
guaranties and standby letters of credit).
121. Clay Gillette makes that point well in his comment on this paper. See Gillette, supra note 31, at
????-????.
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ring nearly as true when the transaction is a purchase by Wal-Mart in the United
States from a small Taiwanese clothing manufacturer for whom it is a major
customer, as it does with a one-time shipment of parts from an American
manufacturer to a small business in India. Accordingly, I turn now to assert a
plausible explanation for those transactions.
2.

Verifying the Authenticity of the Transaction

The second explanation that appeared regularly in my interviews rests on a
variety of usages of letters of credit that serve indirectly to ve rify the authenticity of
cross-border sales transactions. Because those justifications make sense only in the
contexts in which the requirements appear, they are quite local. The most
important justification, for example (the governmental requirements in section (a)
of the following discussion), appears only in transactions that involve imports into
less economically stable countries. Hence, in the sample analyzed here (limited to
transactions involving the United States) it applies only to export transactions going
from the United States to such a country.
As with the practice discussed in the preceding section, the letter of credit here
serves as a verification institution. Specifically, the government or a trading partner
uses a direct or indirect letter-of-credit requirement as a device for limiting the risk
of loss from fraudulent or illegal transactions122 by taking advantage of the superior
informational position of the beneficiary’s bank.
a. Governmental Requirements. The most common example is a set of
governmental requirements that tend to appear in countries for which either the
weakness of the local currency or concerns about money laundering justify
substantial currency controls.123 The simplest pattern involves bogus sale-of-goods
transactions, a common device that wrongdoers use to transfer currency out of a
country in violation of applicable governmental rules. The typical scheme uses a
transaction in which a party in the currency-restricted country purports to purchase
goods from a party in a strong-currency country (such as the United States or the
European Union). If the price of the goods is inflated — an Indian company buys a
dozen tennis balls for $1,000 — then performance of the transaction allows the
Indian buyer to transmit a large amount of currency into a foreign forum, where the
Indian government often has difficulty tracing the funds.124

122. One banker commenting on a draft of this paper emphasized the narrow range of the phenomenon,
transactions that are themselves illegal. Banks do not undertake, for example, to investigate or verify a
manufacturer’s compliance with child- or prison-labor regulations.
123. See Midwest Bank Interview, supra note 47 (transcript at 1).
124. See Midwest Bank Interview, supra note 47 (transcript at 3-4) (offering that example); see also
Foreign Bank Interview, supra note 78 (transcript at 2) (offering a similar example); Major Northeast Bank
Interview, supra note 64 (transcript at 8-9) (suggesting that the parties don’t even bother to ship goods in those
transactions). One banker suggested that a similar transaction could be used in reverse on large sales of goods
going into a currency-restricted country. The Asian seller could issue an invoice reciting an inappropriately
low price; the out-country buyer could pay the invoice directly and transfer the remainder of the actual (noninvoiced) price in hard currency to an account for the benefit of the seller in a secure location. See Foreign
Bank Interview, supra note 78 (transcript at 2-3) (discussing that transaction as well-known in sales of goods to
mainland China).
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Governments can use letters of credit to hinder those transactions by requiring
the use of a letter-of-credit in substantial cross-border sale-of-goods transactions.125
With such a requirement, the government obtains an indirect verification of the
legitimacy of the transaction, because the local bank often would not take the risk
of participating in a transaction that seemed likely to involve an illicit transfer of
funds. Thus, by imposing letter-of-credit requirements, the government indirectly
motivates the banks that participate in the transaction to police apparently illicit
transactions.126
As it happens, few countries impose such absolute requirements.127 Still,
governments do use a variety of less direct devices for protecting against such
transactions, many of which lead indirectly to the use of letters of credit. For example, the government could require a letter of credit as a condition of issuing a
license in advance of an actual import or export transaction.128 Because overseas
sellers might want the buyer to have an advance license to ensure the availability of
hard currency to pay for the goods when they arrive, letters of credit are common in
such a regime.129
Even less intrusively, the government might insist that all transactions
involving the payment of more than a set amount of hard currency overseas must
go through a bank.130 The government then can require banks that participate in
such transactions to verify a number of particular features of the transaction to
prevent fraud. At that point, the marginal cost of the letter of credit (over a
collection transaction) might become so small as to make it preferable in situations
in which the collection transaction otherwise would be preferable.131
In yet another variation, least intrusive of all, the country does not insist on
letters of credit even to issue the license. But insistence on a letter of credit offers
the best option for the ove rseas trading partner to assure the availability of currency
to pay for the transaction, because the local bank will not issue the letter of credit
without ensuring that the applicant has obtained the appropriate licenses to allow
125. See Midwest Bank Interview, supra note 47 (transcript at 1).
126. It seems clear that bank involvement — however it might be brought about — is effective in
discovering fraudulent transactions. Although it is difficult to get data, one banker did tell me that his office
detects three to five such transactions each week. See Major Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 64
(transcript at 7, 9).
127. See Midwest Bank Interview, supra note 47 (transcript at 1-2) (discussing such requirements in
Japan after World War II and their gradual disappearance over the intervening years; citing Malawi and
unspecified countries in Latin America as still requiring letters of credit for transactions in certain
commodities).
128. See Foreign Bank Interview, supra note 78 (transcript at 1) (offering that scenario). Alternatively,
the government might accept lower deposits for license applications when the transaction has a letter of credit.
See Midwest Bank Interview, supra note 47 (transcript at 3-4).
129. See Foreign Bank Interview, supra note 78 (transcript at 1-2) (offering that explanation); Mid-Sized
Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 56 (transcript at 4-5) (same); see also Foreign Bank Interview, supra note
78 (transcript at 3-4 (describing recent series of transactions in which the Chinese government refused to allow
Chinese banks to use hard currency to honor letters of credit that they previously had issued, even in
transactions for which the banks had obtained the approvals appropriate at the time of the transaction).
130. See Midwest Bank Interview, supra note 47 (transcript at 3-4) (suggesting that India imposes such a
requirement for any transaction over the equivalent of five thousand dollars).
131. See Midwest Bank Interview, supra note 47 (transcript at 3-4).
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transfer or the required currency.132 That use of the letter of credit protects the seller
against the risk that after it ships even a conscientious purchaser (and its bank) will
be unable to obtain hard currency to pay the seller for the transaction. In that
regime, the government gets the benefit of the letter-of-credit verification without
formally insisting that the parties use the letter of credit.
b. Private Requirements. Lenders also use letters of credit in a closely analogous
way to verify the authenticity of transactions brought to them by potential
borrowers. The typical pattern here is in a so-called “packing” credit transaction, in
which a business in a major trading city (Hong Kong, in the most common
example) imports goods from one foreign country that it plans immediately to
export to a purchaser in a third country. If that business (the “packer”) wants to
borrow money to fund its acquisition of the goods, or get a letter of credit to
facilitate its acquisition of the goods, the packer must convince its local (that is,
local in Hong Kong) bank of the legitimacy of its export transaction.133
A number of bankers explained to me that the letter of credit from the bank for
the American importer allows the Hong Kong bank to verify that the entire
transaction is authentic.134 Essentially, the use of the letter of credit in those
transactions rests on the view of the foreign bank that it is harder to fabricate a
credible letter of credit from an American bank than it is to fabricate a credible
purchase order from a large American retailer. 135
Like the transactions discussed above, those transactions reflect use by the
trading-center bank of the informational advantage of the importer’s bank. That
bank’s greater facility at understanding its customers’ transactions justifies its
business of issuing letters of credit in those transactions.

132. See Foreign Bank Interview, supra note 78 (transcript at 1-2) (offering that sc enario). One banker
explained that in those transactions the parties waive document exam ination at both ends of the transaction
and that he never has seen rejection of a presentation against such a credit. See Midwest Bank Site Visit
Notes, supra note 44, at 3.
133. See Major Northeast Bank Interview, supra note 64 (transcript at 3-4); Midwest Bank Interview,
supra note 47 (transcript at 9-10); Second Major Northeast Bank Telephone Interview, supra note 44
(transcript at 3); see also Fuji Bank Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at 12) (describing that tran saction as a
“switch” transaction).
134. See Midwest Bank Interview, supra note 47 (transcript at 9-10); Second Major Northeast Bank
Telephone Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at 3-4).
135. See Midwest Bank Interview, supra note 47 (transcript at 10-11); Second Major Northeast Bank
Telephone Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at 3-4). As one banker explained, in countries that offer
interest subsidies for export transactions, the use of a letter of credit can enhance the amount of the subsidy by
extending the term of the loan. Because the bank in a packing-credit transaction loans the money to the
borrower/trading company at the time that the ultimate importer provides its letter of credit, the interest
subsidy can begin accruing at that time. In a transaction without a letter of credit, the bank normally wou ld
not loan the money until the trading company actually had shipped the goods to the ultimate importer. See
Second Major Northeast Bank Telephone Interview, supra note 44 (transcript at 4-5). Effectively, that use of
the letter of credit transforms a very-short-term transit-financing transaction into a much more useful workingcapital financing transaction. See Second Major Northeast Bank Telephone Interview, supra note 44
(transcript at 4-5).
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C ONCLUSION

The relatively small body of information that I collected cannot provide a
definitive view of the letter-of-credit transaction. Nevertheless, it provides a
fascinating window to the world of letters of credit. It should not surprise readers
of my past work that I cannot convince myself of any single unified explanation of
the use of letters of credit.136 Thus, my main goal here is not to explain everything
about why businesses use letters of credit. My goal is less ambitious, to provide
information that will initiate the development of a deeper understanding of the
sophisticated dynamics of the commercial letter-of-credit transaction. I hope that
the data I have collected and made available here will encourage others to look
more closely at the problem.

136. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REV. 625, 682 (1997)
(arguing that no single cause can explain the pattern of secured credit and suggesting a group of positive and
negative factors that collectively can explain that pattern).
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S TATISTICAL APPENDIX
Table A displays the results of three bivariate regressions on the data that I
collected.137 The analysis treats each of the 500 files as an observation; there are
only 487 observations because I excluded the files in which the amount of the credit
was denominated in a currency other than the American dollar. 138 The dependent
variable is the existence of discrepancy, a binary variable that takes the value “1” if
the file complies and “0” if a discrepancy exists. “Amount” is the dollar amount of
the entire letter of credit (rather than the single presentation that I studied).139
“Transaction type” divides the 487 files into import-side and export-side files; the
variable takes the value “1” for export and “0” for import. “Bank role” divides
export-side files into files in which the beneficiary’s bank was an adviser and those
in which it was a confirmer, with adviser files taking the value “1” and confirmer
files taking the value “0.”
TABLE A: BIVARIATE R EGRESSION R ESULTS
N

Coefficient

R

t-statistic

p-value

_________________________________________________________________________

Amount

487

.000

.121

2.68

.007

Transaction Type

487

.105

.119

2.635

.009

Bank Role

242

.049

.035

.549

.583

As Table A shows, the lack of discrepancy correlates with amount weakly,
albeit at a significant level. Specifically, the higher the amount, the more likely the
file is to comply; the lower the amount, the greater the likelihood of discrepancy.
As I explain above (see supra note 80), I think that the most probable explanation
for that relation is that parties invest in more careful compliance efforts on larger
transactions.140
Second, discrepancy correlates highly with the side of the transaction that I
examined: more discrepancies in import transactions, fewer in export transactions.
The body of the Article provides several possible explanations for that relationship,
most prominently in subpart III(C). Because the export transactions were larger

137. I owe special thanks to Mark West for aid on the statistical analysis that goes far beyond the norms
of collegiality (but not so far as to imply responsibility for the analysis).
138. Because I do not have the dates on which the letters of credit were issued and honored, it would be
difficult to select exchange rates to convert those transactions to dollar amounts. Moreover, even if I did have
the dates, it is not clear what date (issuance or payment) would provide the most appropriate exchange rate.
139. To avoid undue reliance on a few files, I only recorded one shipment and presentation from each
letter of credit that I examined, even in the (frequent) cases in which a single letter of credit applied to
multiple shipments and presentations. Unfortunately, I collected only the gross amount of the credit; I did
not collect the amount of the single presentation that I studied.
140. Other explanations are possible, of course. For example, larger transactions might occur in
industries that tend to have simpler documentary requirements or practices of more careful documentary
preparation. More data would be required to evaluate those hypotheses.
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than the import transactions (a correlation that falls just short of significance, at the
0.11 level), it would have been useful to do a multiple regression to ascertain
whether size (rather than transaction side) was the important variable. Because
both the dependent variable (discrepancy) and one of the independent variables
(transaction type) are bounded by zero and 1, the value of an ordinary least-squares
multiple regression of that analysis would be dubious.
Finally, there appears to be no correlation between the bank’s decision to
confirm the letter of credit and the existence of discrepancy.

